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Sub-sessions
The aim of the conference is to present new research on evolution and moral epistemology. The conference is divided into five sub-sessions. 
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Sub-session 1:
​The Epistemology of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments

Several recent discussions question whether there is a sound epistemic principle to support evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) that purport to debunk the justification of our moral beliefs. Some, for example, claim that evolutionary debunking arguments raise problems, if they do, about the modal security or modal safety of our moral beliefs. Others claim, in contrast, that evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs are evidence of error. Yet others think that they reveal a disagreement problem about our moral beliefs. The aim of this sub-session will be to deepen our understanding of the epistemic principle that undergirds debunking arguments that target the justification of our moral beliefs.
Speakers: David Copp, Matt Lutz, Michael Klenk

Sub-session 2:
​The Empirical Presuppositions of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments

The aim of this sub-session is to scrutinize the empirical presuppositions underlying different evolutionary debunking arguments. What are these presuppositions, how do debunkers argue for their (meta)ethical relevance, and are these arguments sound? For instance, what light does empirical research shed on the assumption that there are moral universals, and how might the universality or particularity of moral judgments affect EDAs? Another assumption that plays a role in many EDAs is the purported objectivity of moral judgments. Does experimental research corroborate the assumption that moral judgments are regarded as objective? Does such research have any metaethical implications?
Speakers: Owen Flanagan, Paul Sheldon Davies, Jeroen Hopster

​Sub-session 3:
​The ‘Now What Question’ for Moral Error Theory

​Moral error theorists believe that ordinary moral judgments are systematically untrue. Some moral error theorists use evolutionary debunking arguments in defense of their view. If we assume that error theory is true, then we can ask what we should do with our practice of uttering systematically untrue moral judgments. This is the ‘now what question’ for moral error theory. The aim of this sub-session is to assess the plausibility of the various possible answers to this question. 
Speakers: Jonas Olson, Edward Elliott and Jessica Isserow, Wouter Kalf

​Sub-session 4:
​Evolution and Moral Progress

​This part of the conference tackles a set of questions regarding the relationship between evolutionary explanations of morality and accounts of moral progress. Are such explanations compatible with the occurrence of moral progress? Do they favour realist or anti-realist views of moral progress? What is the role of the notions of truth, justification and knowledge in an evolutionarily informed account of moral progress?
Speakers: Michael Huemer, Eleonora Severini, Julia Hermann

Sub-session 5:
​Moral Objectivity, Truth and Justification

Quite some moral norms appear to be common to all human cultures. Starting with Darwin’s Descent of Man, the existence of such moral universals has been explained convincingly by evolutionary mechanisms. This sub-session is devoted to the question how we should conceive of the objectivity, truth, and justification of our moral beliefs in the light of these evolutionary explanations. For example, is a cognitivist version of Kantian constructivism compatible with evolutionary explanations of moral universals? Should we construe moral truth in terms of correspondence, as moral realists do, or differently? What is the most plausible model of moral justification?
Speakers: Carla Bagnoli, Hanno Sauer, Herman Philipse